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ABSTRACT
The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) is a dominant
insurgent group operating in Iraq and Syria that rose to
prominence when it took over Mosul in June, 2014. In this
paper, we present a data-driven approach to analyzing this
group using a dataset consisting of 2200 incidents of mili-
tary activity surrounding ISIS and the forces that oppose
it (including Iraqi, Syrian, and the American-led coalition).
We combine ideas from logic programming and causal rea-
soning to mine for association rules for which we present
evidence of causality. We present relationships that link
ISIS vehicle-bourne improvised explosive device (VBIED)
activity in Syria with military operations in Iraq, coalition
air strikes, and ISIS IED activity, as well as rules that may
serve as indicators of spikes in indirect fire, suicide attacks,
and arrests.
1. INTRODUCTION
Since its rise to prominence in Iraq and Syria in June,
2014, The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) – also
known as The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)
or simply the Islamic State, has controlled numerous cities
in Sunni-dominated parts of Iraq and Syria. ISIS has dis-
played a high level of sophistication and discipline in its mil-
itary operations in comparison to similar insurgent groups,
which perhaps may be the source of its success. We have
meticulously encoded and recorded 2200 incidents of mili-
tary activity conducted by ISIS and forces that oppose it
(including Iraqi, Syrian, and the American-led coalition) in
a relational database. Our goal was to achieve a better un-
derstanding of how this group operates - which can lead to
new strategies for mitigating ISIS’s operations. Specifically,
we sought to analyze the behavior of ISIS using concepts
from logic programming (in particular APT logic [14, 15])
and causal reasoning [10, 18]. By combining ideas from these
fields, we have been able to conduct a thorough search for
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rules whose precondition consists of multiple atomic propo-
sitions, and we provide evidence of causality by comparing
rules with the same consequence. So, in addition to consid-
ering the probability of a rule (p), we also study a measure
of its causality denoted avg (previously introduced in [10]) –
which, informally, can be thought of as the average increase
in probability a rule’s precondition provides when considered
with each of the comparable rules. Using this approach, we
have found interesting relationships - consider the following:
• Weeks where ISIS conducts infantry operations in Iraq
that are accompanied by indirect fire are indicative of
vehicle-bourne improvised explosive device (VBIED)
operations in Syria in the following week (p = 1.0,
avg = 0.92).
• Weeks in which ISIS conducts operations in Tikrit
and conducts a significant number of executions are
followed by a large spike in improvised explosive de-
vice (IED) usage in Iraq and Syria combined (p =
1.0, avg = 0.97)
• Air strikes by the Syrian government are followed by
mass arrests by ISIS in the following week (avg =
0.91, p = 0.67), and such massive arrests were always
proceeded by Syrian air strikes in our dataset.
• In the week after coalition air strikes are conducted
against Mosul while ISIS is conducting operations in
Al-Anbar province, ISIS greatly increases its IED ac-
tivity in Iraq (p = 0.67, avg = 0.97). However, if
there are also significant ISIS operations occurring in
Syria, the increase in IED usage experienced there is
(p = 0.67, avg = 0.79).
Our findings have also led us to several interesting theories
about ISIS behavior that we have developed as a result of
this data mining effort. These include the following:
• ISIS may employ suicide VBIED operations in Bagh-
dad prior to significant infantry operations in other lo-
cations to prevent the deployment of Iraqi army/police
reinforcements.
• ISIS tends to leverage indirect fire (IDF) as a precursor
to infantry operations - more in keeping with a tradi-
tional military force as opposed to a primary use of
IDF for harassment purposes (as was typically seen by
insurgent groups during Operation Iraqi Freedom).
• As we found relationships between coalition air oper-
ations and an increase in ISIS usage of IEDs - and
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not other, larger weapons systems (i.e. VBIEDs), this
may indicate that ISIS resorts to more distributed,
insurgent-style tactics in the aftermath of such opera-
tions.
To our knowledge, this study represents both the first publicly-
available, data-driven study of ISIS as well as the first com-
bination of APT logic with the causality ideas of [10]. The
rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we de-
scribe our approach and recall key concepts from APT logic
and causal reasoning. This is followed by a description of
our corpus of military events surrounding the actions of ISIS
from June-December, 2014 in Section 3. In Section 4, we de-
scribe our implementation and discuss our results. Finally,
related work is reviewed in Section 5.
2. TECHNICAL APPROACH
2.1 APT Logic
We now present a subset of our previously-introduced
APT logic [14, 15]. Our focus here is on the syntax of the
language utilized with an alternate semantics that is based
on the rule-learning approach described in [14]. This is due
to the fact that we are only concerned with learning the
rules in this paper and determining their level of causality
– we leave problems relating to deduction (i.e. the entail-
ment problem studied in [15]) to future work. APT logic
considers a two-part semantic structure: threads (sequences
of events) and interpretations (probability distributions over
such sequences). Initially, we focus on a semantics restricted
to threads.
We assume the existence of a set of ground atoms, A which
in this case correspond with events over time and use the
symbol n to denote the size of this set. We shall partition
the ground atoms into two subsets: action atoms Aact and
environmental atoms Aenv. Action atoms describe actions
of certain actors, and environmental atoms describe aspects
of the environment. We will use nact, nenv to denote the
quantity of ground atoms in Aact,Aenv, respectively. We
can connect atoms using ¬,∧,∨ to create formulas in the
normal way. A world is a subset of atoms that are considered
to be true. A thread is a series of worlds, each corresponding
to a discrete time-point, which are represented by simple
natural numbers in the range 1, . . . , tmax. We shall use Th[t]
to refer to the world specified by Th at time t. A thread
(Th) at time t satisfies a formula f (denoted Th[t] |= f) by
the following recursive definition:
• For some a ∈ A, Th[t] |= a iff a ∈ Th[t]
• For f = ¬f ′, Th[t] |= f iff Th[t] |= f ′ is false
• For f = f ′∧f ′′, Th[t] |= f iff Th[t] |= f ′ and Th[t] |= f ′′
• For f = f ′ ∨ f ′′, Th[t] |= f iff Th[t] |= f ′ or Th[t] |= f ′′
We also note that based on how often a given formula oc-
curs within a thread, we can obtain a prior probability for
that formula. For instance, consider formula g. We can com-
pute its prior probability (w.r.t. thread Th) as the fraction
of time points where g is satisfied:
ρ =
|{t|Th[t] |= g}|
tmax
(1)
Note that we use the notation | · | for the cardinality of a set.
Our goal in this section is for some event g to identify previ-
ously occurring event c such that the conditional probability
of g occurring given c is greater than pg. In this paper, we
shall only look at finding APT rules where c occurs in the
time period right before g. The case where multiple time pe-
riods elapse between c and g is left to future work. Hence, we
introduce an APT rule of the following form: c;p g, which
intuitively means that “c is followed by g in one time-step
with probability p.” We shall refer to c as the precondition
and g as the consequence. We say thread Th |= c;p g iff:
p =
|{t s.t. Th[t] |= c and Th[t+ 1] |= g}|
|{t s.t. Th[t] |= c}| (2)
This alternate definition of semantics is not new: it is a vari-
ant of rule satisfaction with the existential frequency func-
tion of [14] and also of “trace semantics” used for a PCTL
variant in [9]. In this paper, we are focused on learning rules
where c is a conjunction of positive atoms and g is a single
positive atom. The number of atoms in the conjunction c is
referred to as the “dimension” of the rule c ;p g. We will
also be concerned with two other measures of a given rule:
the “negative probability” (used to describe the probabilistic
rules of [17]) and the notion of support (a standard concept
in association rule learning). First, we define“negative prob-
ability” – denoted p∗ – for a given rule of the aforementioned
format.
p∗ =
|{t s.t. Th[t] |= g and Th[t− 1] 6|= c}|
|{t s.t. Th[t] |= g}| (3)
Simply put, p∗ is the number of times that the consequence
of a rule occurs without the head occurring prior. We can
think of p as a measure of precision of a given rule while p∗
is more akin to a measure of recall. Next, we formally define
the notion of support (s) as follows.
s = |{t s.t. Th[t] |= c}| (4)
For a given rule r, we shall use the notation pr, p
∗
r , sr, re-
spectively. We will also use the notation ρr to denote the
prior probability of the consequence. When it is obvious
from context which rule we are referring to (as in the exper-
imental results section), we will drop the subscript.
2.2 Determining Causality
Next, we describe how for a given action, g, we identify
potential causes based on a set of rules for which g is the
consequence. In considering possible causes, we must first
identify a set of prima facie causes for g [10, 18]. We present
the definition in terms of APT logic below.
Definition 2.1 (Prima Facie Cause [10, 18]). Given
APT logic formulas c, g and thread Th, we say c is a prima
facie cause for g w.r.t. Th if:
1. There exists time t such that Th[t] |= g (g occurs with
a probability greater than zero)
2. There exists t, t′ where t < t′ such that Th[t] |= c and
Th[t′] |= g (c occurs before g)
3. For r ≡ c ;p g where Th |= r, we have p > ρr (the
probability of the consequence occurring after the pre-
condition is greater than the prior probability of the
consequence)
As we will assume the existence of a single thread, Th
(which is our historical corpus of data), we will often use the
language “prima facie causal rule” or “PF-rule” to describe
a rule c;p g where c is a prima facie cause for g w.r.t. Th.
Next, we adopt the method of [10] to determine if an APT
rule is causal. First, in determining if a given PF-rule is
causal, we must consider other, related PF-rules. Intuitively,
a given rule r ≡ c ;p g explains why some instances of g
occur within a thread. Another rule r′ ≡ c′ ;p′ g is related
if it also explains why some of those same instances occur.
Formally, we say r and r′ are related if there exists t such
that Th[t] |= c ∧ c′ and Th[t+ 1] |= g. Hence, we will define
related PF-rules (for a given rule r ≡ c;p g) as follows.
R(r) = {r′ s.t. r′ 6≡ r and r, r′ are related}
Next, we will look at how to compare two related rules.
The key purpose from [10] behind doing so is to study how
the probability of the rule changes in cases where both pre-
conditions co-occur in comparison to the probability where
exactly one of the preconditions occurs. So, given rules r, r′
as defined above, we have the following notation: pr,r′ and
p¬r,r′ , which are defined as the point probabilities that will
cause the following two rules to be satisfied by Th.
c ∧ c′ ;pr,r′ g
¬c ∧ c′ ;p¬r,r′ g
So, pr,r′ is the probability that g occurs given both precon-
ditions, and p¬r,r′ is the probability that g occurs given just
the precondition of the second rule and not of the first. The
idea is that if pr,r′ − p¬r,r′ > 0, then there is something
about the precondition of r that causes g to occur that is
not present in r′. Following directly from [10], we measure
the average of this quantity to determine how causal a given
rule is as follows:
avg =
∑
r′∈R(r) pr,r′ − p¬r,r′
|R(r)|
Intuitively, avg(r) measures the degree of causality exhib-
ited by rule r. Additionally, using this same intuition, we
find it useful to include a few other related measures when
examining causality. First, we define min, defined below:
min = min
r′∈R(r)
(pr,r′ − p¬r,r′)
This tells us the “least causal” comparison of r with all re-
lated rules. Another measure we will use is frac, defined as
follows:
frac(r) =
|{r′ s.t. (pr,r′ − p¬r,r′) ≥ 0}|
|R(r)|
This provides a fraction of the related rules whose proba-
bility remains the same or decreases if the precondition of
r is not present. Hence, a number closer to 1 likely indi-
cates that r is more causal. By using multiple causality
measurements, we can have a better determination of more
significant causality relationships.
2.3 Algorithms
Next, given a thread, we provide a variant of the APT-
Extract algorithm [14] that we call PF-Rule-Extract. Es-
sentially, this algorithm generates all possible Aenv up to a
certain size (specified by the argument MaxDim) and then
searches for correlation. It returns rules whose precondi-
tion occurs a specified number of times (a lower bound on
support for a rule) - specified with the argument SuppLB.
We make several modifications specific to our application to
support reasoning.
• We reduce the run-time of the algorithm considerably
over APT-Extract. As APT-Extract explores all possi-
ble combinations of atoms up to size MaxDim, it runs
in time O(
(
nenv
MaxDim
)
). However, PF-Rule-Extract only
examines combinations of atoms that occur in a given
time period – hence, reducing run-time toO(
(
maxt(nt)
MaxDim
)
)
where nt is the number of atoms in Aenv true at time
t. We find in practice that maxt(nt) << nenv.
• We further reduce the run-time by not considering el-
ements of Aenv that occur less than the lower bound
on support - as they would never appear in a rule.
• We guarantee that all rules returned by PF-Rule-Extract
are PF-rules.
Algorithm 1 PF-Rule-Extract
Require: Thread Th, sets of atoms Aact,Aenv, posi-
tive natural numbers MaxDim, SuppLB, real number
minProb
Ensure: Set of rules R
1: Set R = ∅
2: for g ∈ {a ∈ Aact s.t. ∃t where Th[t] |= a} do
3: preCond(g) = ∅
4: for t ∈ {1, . . . , tmax s.t. Th[t+ 1] |= g} do
5: Let X be the set of all combinations of size
MaxDim (or less) of elements in Th[t]∩Aenv that
occur at least SuppLB times.
6: preCond(g) = preCond(g) ∪X
7: end for
8: for c ∈ preCond(g) do
9: Compute ρ, p, s, as per Equations 1,2, and 4
10: if (s ≥ SuppLB)∧ (p > ρ)∧ (p ≥ minProb) then
11: R = R ∪ {r}
12: end if
13: end for
14: end for
15: return Set R
Note that APT-Extract allows for multiple time periods
between preconditions and consequences – PF-Rule-Extract
can also be easily modified to find rules of this sort through a
simple modification of line 4. Next, we provide some formal
results to show that PF-Rule-Extract finds rules that meet
the requirements of Definition 2.1 and show that it explores
all possible combinations up to size MaxDim that are sup-
ported by the data that meet the requirement for minimum
support even with our efficiency improvements.
Proposition 2.1. Given thread Th as input, PF-Rule-
Extract produces a set of rules R such that each r ∈ R is a
prima facie causal rule.
Proof. The first requirement for a prima facie cause is
met by line 2 of PF-Rule-Extract, as the algorithm only con-
siders consequences that have occurred at least once in Th –
hence, they have a prior probability greater than zero. The
second requirement is met by line 4, as we only consider
atoms that occurred immediately before the consequence
when constructing the precondition. Finally, the third con-
dition is met by the if statement at line 10 which will only
select rules whose probability is greater than the prior prob-
ability of the consequence.
Proposition 2.2. PF-Rule-Extract finds all PF-rules whose
precondition is a conjunction of size MaxDim or a size con-
taining fewer atoms and where both the precondition occurs
at least SuppLB times in Th and the probability is greater
than minProb.
Proof. By Proposition 2.1, every consequence that could
be used in a PF-rule is considered, so we need only to con-
sider the precondition. Suppose that there is a PF-rule
whose precondition occurs at least SuppLB times that has a
size of MaxDim or smaller. Hence, the precondition is com-
prised of m ≤MaxDim atoms: a1, . . . , am. Clearly, as this
precondition occurs at least SuppLB times in Th, each of
a1, . . . , am must also occur SuppLB times by line 5 - so that
the precondition must be considered at that point. The only
condition that would prevent the rule from being returned
is line 10, but again, clearly these are met by the statement
of the proposition. Hence, we have a contradiction.
Once we have identified the PF-rules using PF-Rule-Extract,
we must then compare related rules with each other. The al-
gorithm PF-Rule-Compare returns the top k rules for each
consequence. Again, here we take advantage of our spe-
cific application to reduce the run-time of this comparison.
In particular, for a given rule, we need not compare it to
all the rules returned by PF-Rule-Extract; we only need to
compare it to those that share the consequence. By sorting
the rules by consequence - a linear time operation (line 3),
we are able to reduce the cost of the quadratic operation
for the rule comparisons (a brute-force method would take
O(|R|2) while this method requires O((maxg |Rg|)2 + |R|) –
and we have observed that maxg |Rg| << |R|).
Algorithm 2 PF-Rule-Compare
Require: Set of rules R, natural number k
Ensure: Set of rules R′
1: Set R′ = ∅.
2: for g ∈ Aact do
3: Set Rg = {c;p g ∈ R}
4: for r ∈ Rg do
5: Calculate avg for rule r (Equation 5 by comparing
it to all related rules in Rg \ {r})
6: end for
7: From the set Rg, add the top k rules by avg to the
set R′
8: end for
9: return Set R′
3. ISIS DATASET
We collected data on 2200 military events that occurred
from June 8th through December 31st, 2014 that involved
ISIS and forces opposing ISIS. Events were classified into one
of 159 event types - and these events were used as predicates
for APT logic atoms. We list a sampling of the predicates
we used in Table 1. Many predicates are unary because
they correspond with ISIS actions (i.e. armedAtk) while
those dealing with operations by other actors (i.e. airOp)
and predicates denoting spikes in activity (i.e. VBIEDSpike)
accept more than one argument. Nearly every predicate has
one argument that corresponds to the location in which the
associated event took place. See Figure 1 for a sampling of
locations in the ISIS dataset.
We obtained our data primarily from reports published by
the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) [5], and we aug-
mented it with other reputable sources including MapAction
[4, 6], Google Maps [3], and Humanitarian Response [2]. We
devised a code-book as well as coding standards for events,
and one of our team members functioned as a quality-control
to reduce errors in human coding.
Figure 1: Map illustrating cities associated with events in
the ISIS dataset.
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
4.1 Experimental Setup
We implemented our PF-Rule-Extract and PF-Rule-Compare
in Python 2.8x and ran it on a commodity machine equipped
with an Intel Core i5 CPU (2.7 GHz) with 16 GB of RAM
running Windows 7. The time periods we utilized were
weeks - hence, we had 30 time periods in our thread. We had
980 distinct environmental atoms (Aenv). Our action atoms
(Aact) corresponded to weeks where the number of incidents
for certain activity rose to or past one or two moving stan-
dard deviations (denoted 1×σ, 2×σ respectively, computed
based on the previous 4 weeks) above the four-week moving
average (computed based on the previous 4 weeks). We re-
fer to these atoms as “spikes” and show some sample atoms
denoting such spikes in Table 1. The spikes are designated
for three locations: Iraq, Syria, or both theaters combined.
We also included these spikes in the set of environmental
atoms as well (Aact ⊂ Aenv).
We set the parameters of PF-Rule-Extract as follows:
MaxDim = 3, SuppLB = 3, minProb = 0.5. For PF-Rule-
Compare, we did not set a particular k value. Instead, we
used avg to rank the rules by causality for a given conse-
quence. In this paper, we report the top causal rules (in
terms of avg) for some of the consequences. We also note
that the number of related rules provides insight into that
rule’s significance - we discuss this quantity in our analy-
sis. We examine some of the top rules in terms of avg and
Table 1: A sampling of predicate symbols used to describe
events in the ISIS Dataset
Predicate Intuition
airOp(X,Y ) Actor X (typically “Coalition,”
“Syrian Government,” or “U.S.”)
conducts an air campaign against
ISIS in the vicinity of city Y .
armedAtk(X) ISIS conducts an armed attack
(a.k.a. infantry operation) in city
X.
IED(X) ISIS conducts an attack using an
improvised explosive device (IED)
in city X.
indirectFire(X) ISIS conducts an indirect fire oper-
ation (i.e. mortars) near city X.
VBIED(X) ISIS conducts an attack using a
vehicle-bourne improvised explo-
sive device (VBIED or car-bomb) in
city X.
armedAtkSpike(X,Y ) There is a spike in ISIS armed
attacks in country X that is Y
amount over the 4-month moving
average (Y is expressed in terms of
moving standard deviations).
VBIEDSpike(X,Y ) There is a spike in ISIS VBIEDs in
country X that is Y amount over
the 4-month moving average (Y is
expressed in terms of moving stan-
dard deviations).
describe the military insights that they provide. Our team
includes a former military officer with over a decade of expe-
rience in military operations that includes two combat tours
in Operation Iraqi Freedom. In addition to avg, we also ex-
amined the rule’s probability (p) - the fraction of times the
consequence follows the precondition, the negative proba-
bility (p∗) - the fraction of times the consequence is not
proceeded by the precondition, the prior probability of the
consequence (ρ), and the additional causal measures intro-
duced in this paper - min, frac. The relationship specified
in the rule can be considered more significant if p >> ρ, p∗
is closer to 0, min ≥ 0, and avg, frac are close to 1. These
measures are discussed in more detail in Section 2.
4.2 Algorithm Efficiency
In Section 2, we described some performance improve-
ments that we utilized in PF-Rule-Extract (which is based
on APT-Extract [14]) that are specific to this application.
The first performance improvement was the reduction in the
number of atoms used to generate the preconditions (which
were conjunctions of atoms of up to size 3 in our experi-
ments). First, we limited the number of atoms to be used
in such combinations based on the weeks in which they oc-
curred. Even though we had 980 environmental atoms, no
more than 93 occurred during any given week (this is the
value maxt(nt) from Section 2). Further, by eliminating
atoms that occurred less than the SuppLB from consider-
ation, this lowered it further to 49 atoms per week at the
most. This directly leads to fewer combinations of atoms
generated for the precondition. A comparison is shown in
Table 2. Note that the values for APT-Extract are exact,
while the remaining are upper bounds. Again, this sub-
stantial, multiple-order-of-magnitude savings in the number
of rules explored is a result of the relative sparseness of our
dataset and the fact that our preconditions consisted of con-
junctions of positive atoms. This efficiency is primarily what
enabled us to find and compare rules in a matter of minutes
on a commodity system.
Table 2: Improvement in Algorithm Efficiency
Technique Atoms Combinations
Explored
APT-Extract [14] 980 182, 122, 025
maxt(nt) 93 8, 853, 042
maxt(nt) and consider 49 1, 296, 834
only atoms that occur more
than SuppLB times
4.3 ISIS Military Tactics
In this section, we investigate rules that provide insight
into ISIS’s military tactics – in particular, we found inter-
esting and potentially casual relationships that provide in-
sight into their infantry operations, use of terror tactics (i.e.
VBIEDs), and decisions to employ roadside bombs and to
launch suicide operations.
Table 3: Causal Rules for Spikes in Armed Attacks (Iraq
and Syria Combined)
No. Precondition avg p p
∗
1. indirectFire(Baiji)∧ 0.81 0.67 0.50
armedAtk(Balad)
2. indirectFire(Baiji)∧ 0.81 0.67 0.50
armedAtk(Balad)∧
VBIED(Baghdad)
Armed Attacks. The prior probability of large spikes
(2 × σ) (see figure 2) for ISIS armed attacks for Iraq and
Syria was 0.154. However, for our two most causal rules
for this spike (Table 3), we derived this probability as 0.67.
Such spikes likely indicate major infantry operations by the
Islamic State. Rule 1 states that indirect fire at Baiji (at-
tributed to ISIS) along with an armed attack in Balad leads
to a spike in armed attacks by the group in the next week
while rule 2 mirrors rule 1 but adds VBIED activity in Bagh-
dad as part of the precondition. We note the relatively high
p∗ (0.5 in this case), which indicates that each spike in armed
attacks of this type are not necessarily proceeded by this pre-
condition, despite the relatively high value for avg, hinting
at causality (each of these rules was compared with 265 re-
lated rules and had frac = 1 and min = 0 – showing little
indication of a related rule being more causal). We believe
that the strong causality and the high value for p∗ indicate
that these rules may well be “token causes” – causes for a
specific event - in this case, we think it is likely ISIS offensive
operations in Baiji. This makes sense, as a common military
tactic is to prepare the battlefield with indirect fire (which it
seems ISIS did in the prior week). It is unclear if the VBIED
incidents in Baghdad are related due to the co-occurrence.
That said, it is notable that VBIED operations are often
used as “terror” tactics as opposed to part of a sustained
operation. If so, this may have been part of a preparatory
phase (that included indirect fire in Baiji), and the purpose
of the VBIED events in Baghdad was to prevent additional
Iraqi Security Force deployment from Baghdad to Baiji. We
note in one case supporting this rule (on July 25th, 2014)
that ISIS also conducted IED attacks on power-lines that
support Baghdad - which may have also been designed to
hinder deployment of reinforcements. Here, it is also im-
portant to note the ongoing Infantry operations in Balad
(specified in the precondition) - which would consume ISIS
resources and perhaps make it more difficult to respond to
further deployment of government security forces. Though
this is likely a token cause, this may be indicative of ISIS
tactics when preparing to concentrate force on certain ob-
jectives (in this case Baiji) while maintaining ongoing op-
erations (Balad), as a spike in armed attacks likely indi-
cates a surge of light infantry-style soldiers into the area (a
manpower-intensive operation).
Figure 2: ISIS Spikes in Armed Attacks in Iraq and
Syria per Week
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Spikes in VBIED Incidents. VBIED incidents have been
a common terror tactic used by religious Sunni extremist
insurgent groups in Iraq in the past – including Al Qaeda
in Iraq, Ansar al Sunnah, Ansar al Islam, and now ISIS.
We found two relationships that are potentially causal for
spikes in VBIED activity in Iraq and Syria combined, shown
in Table 4.
Table 4: Causal Rules for Spikes in VBIED Incidents in
Iraq and Syria Combined
No. Precondition avg p p
∗
3. armedAtk(Balad)∧ 0.95 1.00 0.25
indirectFire(Baiji)
Rule 3 states that if infantry operations in Balad accom-
panied by indirect fire operations in Baiji occur, we should
expect a major (2 × σ) spike in VBIED activity (see fig-
ure 3) by ISIS (Iraq and Syria combined). We believe this
rule provides further evidence of the use of VBIEDs to pull
security forces away from other parts of the operational the-
ater. It is interesting to note that the negative probability
is only 0.25 - which means that most of the VBIED spikes
we observed were related to operations in Balad and Baiji.
This highlights the strategic importance of these two cities
to ISIS: Baiji is home to a major oil refinery while Balad is
near a major Iraqi air base. We also found solid evidence of
causality for this rule - based on 209 related rules, we found
min = 0.5 which means adding a second precondition to
this rule increases the probability of the second rule by at
least 0.5
Figure 3: Spikes in ISIS VBIED Activity in Iraq and
Syria per Week
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Spikes in IED Incidents. Improvised explosive device
(IED) incidents have been a common tactic used by Iraqi in-
surgents throughout the U.S.-led Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Though the IED comprises a smaller weapons system nor-
mally employed by local insurgent cells, spikes in such ac-
tivity could be meaningful. For instance, it may indicate
action ordered by a strategic-level command that is being
carried out on the city level, or it may indicate improved
logistic support to provide local cells the necessary muni-
tions to carry out such operations in larger numbers. Such
spikes only occur with a prior probability of 0.19. In Table 5,
we show a rather strong precondition for such attacks that
consist of infantry operations in Tikrit and a spike in exe-
cutions. In this Table, rule 4 states that infantry operations
in Tikrit, when accompanied by a spike in executions, lead
to a spike (1× σ) (see figure 4) in Iraq and Syria combined
- with a probability of 1.0 - much higher than the prior of
the consequence. With avg of 0.97 (based on a compari-
son with 1180 other rules), this relationship appears highly
causal (frac = 1.0, min = 0.0) although 40% of 1× σ IED
spikes were not accounted for by this precondition.
Table 5: Causal Rules for Spikes in IED Incidents in Iraq
and Syria Combined
No. Precondition avg p p
∗
4. armedAtk(T ikrit)∧ 0.97 1.00 0.40
executionSpike(Total, 2σ)
4.4 Relationships between Iraqi and Syrian The-
aters
ISIS has clearly leveraged itself as a force operating in
both Iraq and Syria, and the identification of relationships
Figure 4: Spikes in ISIS IEDs in Iraq and Syria per
Week
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between incidents in relation to the two theaters may in-
dicate some sophisticated operational coordination on their
part. We have found some evidence of these cross-theater
relationships with regard to suicide operations in Iraq (po-
tentially affected by other events in Syria) and VBIED op-
erations in Syria (potentially affected by other operations in
Iraq).
VBIED Spikes in Syria. Table 6 shows our most causal
rules whose consequence is a 1×σ spike (over the four-month
moving average) (see figures 5, 6) in ISIS VBIED events in
Syria. Rule 5 provides a precondition of a spike in armed
attacks in Iraq that includes a major spike in indirect fire
activity while rule 6 has the same precondition but includes
an additional VBIED event in Baghdad. We believe that
the spike in armed attacks indicates major ISIS operations
in Iraq and the inclusion of indirect fire events also indicates
that ISIS soldiers specializing in weapon systems such as
mortars may also be concentrated in Iraqi operations. Taken
together, this may indicate a shift in ISIS resources toward
Iraq - which may mean that operations have shifted away
from Syria. Hence, VBIED attacks, which once prepared,
are less manpower-intensive, nevertheless provide a show-
of-force in the secondary theater. We also note that the
probability of these rules (1.00) is significantly higher than
the prior of these spikes (0.19) and that the causality value is
also high for each of the 983 related rules, as the probability
either remains the same or increases when considering one
of these preconditions (in other words, frac = 1 and min =
0).
Figure 5: Spikes in ISIS VBIEDs in Syria per Week
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Figure 6: Comparison of ISIS Armed Attacks and
VBIEDs in Syria per Week
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Table 6: Causal Rules for Spikes in VBIED Operations in
Syria
No. Precondition avg p p
∗
5. armedAtkSpike(Iraq, σ)∧ 0.92 1.00 0.20
indirFireSpike(Iraq, 2σ)
6. armedAtkSpike(Iraq, σ)∧ 0.92 1.00 0.20
indirFireSpike(Iraq, 2σ)∧
VBIED(Baghdad)
Operations Shifting to Syria. In rules 5 and 6 of Ta-
ble 6, we saw how increased operations in Iraq led to the
use of VBIEDs in Syria – perhaps due to a focus on more
manpower-heavy operations in Iraq. Interestingly, rule 7
shown in Table 7 indicates that less manpower-intensive
operations in Iraq that have a terror component seem to
have a causal relationship (based on avg = 0.97, frac =
1.0, min = 0.5 found by comparing to 95 related rules) with
significant indirect fire operations in Syria (that occur with a
prior probability of 0.08). As discussed earlier, indirect fire is
normally used to “prepare the battlefield” for infantry oper-
ations, so this rule may be indicative of a shift in manpower
toward Syria - and the use of a VBIED tactic in Baghdad
(less manpower-intensive but very sensational) seems to al-
ways proceed a major (2×σ over the moving average) spike
in indirect fire activity in Syria in our data (hence, a negative
probability of 0.0).
Table 7: Causal Rules for Spikes in Indirect Fire Opera-
tions in Syria
No. Precondition avg p p
∗
7. IED(Baghdad)∧ 0.97 0.67 0.00
VBIED(Ramadi)
4.5 ISIS Activities Related to Opposition Air
Strikes
Reaction to Syrian Government Air Strikes. Rule 8,
shown in Table 8, tells us that a 2 × σ spike in arrests (see
figure 7) was always (p∗ = 0.0) proceeded by an air strike
conducted by the Syrian government. The prior probability
Table 8: Causal Rules for Spikes in Arrests (Iraq and Syria
Combined)
No. Precondition avg p p
∗
8. airStrike(SyrianGov,Damascus) 0.91 0.67 0.00
for such a spike in arrests is 0.08. Further, we found evidence
of causality - the actions of the Syrian government raised the
probability of each of 33 related rules by at least 0.5. One
potential reason to explain why arrests follow Syrian air op-
erations is that unlike western nations, Syria generally lacks
advanced technical intelligence-gathering capabilities to de-
termine targets, and Syria likely relies on extensive human
intelligence networks - especially within Iraq and Syria. Suc-
cessful targeting from the air by the Syrian government may
then indicate that ISIS’s counter-intelligence efforts (activi-
ties designed to locate spies within its ranks) may have failed
and so the organization perhaps then decides to conduct
massive arrests.
Figure 7: Spikes in ISIS Arrests in Iraq and Syria
per Week
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Table 9: Causal Rules for Major Spikes in Suicide Opera-
tions in Iraq
No. Precondition avg p p
∗
9. airStrike(IraqGovt,Baiji)∧ 0.71 0.67 0.60
armedAtk(Balad)∧
VBIED(Baghdad)
Reaction to Iraqi Government Air Strikes. In Table 9,
rule 9 tells us that a 2× σ spike (see figure 8) in suicide op-
erations in Iraq is related to a precondition involving Iraqi
aerial operations in Baiji, ISIS infantry operations in Balad,
and a VBIED in Baghdad. The rule shows that these spikes
in suicide operations are 3.5 times more likely with this pre-
condition. Though avg is lower than some of the other rules
presented thus far, it has a value for min of 0.3 - the mini-
mum increase in probability afforded to any of the 82 related
rules to which we add the precondition of rule 9. The pre-
condition indicates that ISIS may have recently expended a
VBIED (expensive in terms of equipment) while it has on-
going infantry operations in Balad (expensive in terms of
personnel) - hence, it may seek a more economical attack
(in terms of both manpower and equipment) that still has
a significant terror component - and it would appear that a
suicide attack provides a viable option to respond to such
air strikes.
Figure 8: Spikes in ISIS Suicide Operations in Iraq
per Week
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Table 10: Causal Rules for Major Spikes in IED Operations
in Iraq
No. Precondition avg p p
∗
10. airStrike(Coalition,Mosul)∧ 0.97 0.67 0.33
armedAtk(Fallujah)
Table 11: Causal Rules for Major Spikes in IED Operations
in Syria
No. Precondition avg p p
∗
11. airStrike(Coalition,Mosul)∧ 0.79 0.67 0.33
armedAtk(Ramadi)∧
armedAtkSpike(Syria, σ)
Reaction to Air Strikes by the U.S.-led coalition.
Rules 10 (frac = 1.0, min = 0.5, 562 related rules) and
11 (frac = 1.0, min = 0.38, 81 related rules) - shown in
Tables 10 and 11 - illustrate two different outcomes from
coalition air operations in Mosul. In both cases, ISIS has
active operations in the Al-Anbar province – both Ramadi
and Fallujah have similar demographics. Hence, the major
difference is that the precondition of rule 11 also includes
significant infantry operations in Syria. So, even though
both rules result in an increase in IED activity (2×σ above
average, a spike that in both cases occurs with a prior prob-
ability of 0.12) (see figures 9, 10) - the increase occurs in Iraq
for rule 10 and Syria for rule 11. It may be the case that
ISIS is increasing IED activity in response to coalition air
strikes in the location of their main effort. Further, the rel-
atively low negative probability (0.33) along with relatively
high values for min may indicate that coalition air strikes
in Mosul are likely viewed as important factors contributing
to ISIS decisions to increase IED activity. We may also note
that the use of IED activity in the aftermath of coalition
air strikes could also be due to the size of the weapon. An
IED can be fairly small, easily disassembled and stored in
an innocuous location - hence, it is weapon system that the
coalition cannot sense and target from the air.
Figure 9: Spikes in ISIS IEDs in Iraq per Week
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Figure 10: Spikes in ISIS IEDs in Syria per Week
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5. RELATED WORK
To the best of our knowledge, this paper represents the
first purely data-driven study of ISIS, and it is also the first
to combine the causality framework of [10] with APT-Logic.
However, there has been a wealth of research conducted
where rule-based systems have been applied to terrorist and
insurgent groups, as well as other work on modeling insur-
gent actions. Here, we review this related work and also
discuss other approaches to causal reasoning.
Rule-based systems. Previously, there has been a vari-
ety of research on modeling the actions of terrorist and in-
surgent groups. Perhaps most well-known is the Stochastic
Opponent Modeling Agents (SOMA) [11, 12], which was de-
veloped with the goal of better understanding different cul-
tural groups along with their behaviors. This is also based on
a rule-based framework known as action-probabilistic (AP)
rules [8], which is a predecessor of APT-logic used in this
paper [14, 15]. The SOMA system produces a probabilistic
logic representation for understanding group behaviors and
reasoning about the types of actions a group may take. In re-
cent years, this system has been used to better understand
terror groups like Hamas [12] and Hezbollah [11] through
probabilistic rules. However, it can also be used with cul-
tural, religious, and political groups - as it has been demon-
strated with other groups in the Minorities at Risk Orga-
nizational Behavior (MAROB) dataset [1]. The work on
SOMA was followed by an adoption of APT-Logic [14, 15],
which extended AP-rules with a temporal component. APT
logic was also applied to the groups of the MAROB dataset
as well as Shi’ite Iraqi insurgent groups circa 2007 (present
during the American-led Operation Iraqi Freedom) [15] 1.
Perhaps most significantly, APT-Logic was applied to an-
other dataset for the study of the terror groups Lashkar-e-
Taiba (LeT) and Indian Mujahideen (IM) in two compre-
hensive volumes that discuss the policy implications of the
behavioral rules learned in these cases [17, 16]. The main
similarity between the previous work leveraging SOMA, AP-
rules, and/or APT-logic and this paper is that both leverage
probabilistic rule learning. However, all of the aforemen-
tioned rule-learning approaches only discover correlations,
while this work is focused on rules that are not only of high
probability, but also have a likely casual relationship. We
also note that none of this previous work studies ISIS but
rather other terrorist and insurgent groups.
Analysis of insurgent military tactics. We also note
that the previous rule-learning approaches to understanding
terrorist and insurgent behavior have primarily focused on
analyzing political events and how they affect the actions of
groups such as LeT and IM. However, with the exception
of some of the work on APT-Logic which studies Shi’ite
Iraqi insurgents [14], the aforementioned work is generally
not focused on tactical military operations - unlike this pa-
per. However, there have been other techniques introduced
in the literature that have been designed to better account
for ground action. Previously, a statistical-based approach
leveraged leaked classified data [19] 2 to predict trends of vi-
olent activity during the American-led Operation Enduring
Freedom in Afghanistan. However, this work was primarily
focused on prediction and not identifying causal relation-
ships of interest to analysis as in this work. We also note
that this work does not rely on the use of leaked classified
data, but rather on open-source information. Another inter-
esting approach is the model-based approach of [7], in which
subject matter experts create models of insurgent behavior
using a combination of fuzzy cognitive maps and complex
networks to run simulations and study “what-if” scenarios.
However, unlike this paper, the work of [7] is not as data-
driven an approach.
Causal reasoning. The comparison of rules by avg as a
measure of causality was first introduced in [10] and further
studied in [9]. It draws on the philosophical ideas of [18].
However, this work has primarily looked at preconditions as
single atomic propositions. Further, it did not explore the
issue of efficiency. As we look to identify rules whose pre-
condition consists of more than one atomic proposition, we
introduce a rule-learning approach. Further, moving beyond
previous rule-learning approaches such as that introduced in
[8] and [14], we show practical techniques to improve efficien-
cies of such algorithms. Further, we also improve upon the
efficiency of computing avg - a practical issue not discussed
in [10, 9]. We note that neither this previous work on causal-
1ISIS is a Sunni group and did not exist in its present form
in 2007.
2Resulting from WikiLeaks in 2010.
ity nor APT-logic makes independence assumptions. This
differs substantially from earlier work on causality such as
[13], which relies on graphical models that make relatively
strong independence assumptions. Our goal was to avoid
such structures in order to provide a more purely data-driven
approach. A key aspect of this work as opposed to previ-
ous studies on causality is that we leverage the intuitions
of APT logic and AP rules, in which the rule-learning algo-
rithm searches for combinations of atomic propositions that
are related to a given consequence.
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we conducted a data-driven study on the in-
surgent group ISIS using a combination of APT-logic, rule
learning, and causal reasoning to identify cause-and-effect
behavior rules concerning the group’s actions. We believe
our approach is of significant utility for both military deci-
sion making and the creation of policy. In the future, we
look to extend this work in several ways: first, we look to
create non-ground rules that generalize some of the precon-
ditions further. This would allow us to understand the cir-
cumstances in which ISIS conducts general operations (as
opposed to operations specific to a given city or to a geo-
graphic area). We also look to study more complex temporal
relationships – possibly using a more fine-grain resolution for
time and studying rules where the cause is followed by the
effect in more than one unit of time. We also look to leverage
additional variables about the environment, including data
about weather, information (including social media opera-
tions), and the political situation to find more interesting
relationships.
7. REFERENCES
[1] V. Asal, C. Johnson, and J. Wilkenfeld. Ethnopolitical
violence and terrorism in the middle east. In J. J.
Hewitt, J. Wilkenfeld, and T. R. Gurr, editors, Peace
and Conflict 2008. Paradigm Publishers, 2007.
[2] Districts of iraq. United Nations Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2014.
http://www.humanitarianresponse.info/operations/
iraq/search?search=governorate+district.
[3] Google maps. Google Inc., 2014.
https://www.google.com/maps/.
[4] Iraq - district reference maps. MapAction, 2014.
http://www.mapaction.org/component/search/
?searchword=iraq+map&ordering=
newest&searchphrase=all&limit=100&areas[0]=maps.
[5] Situation reports. Institute for the Study of War,
2014. http://understandingwar.org/.
[6] Syria: Governorate and district reference maps.
MapAction, 2014. http://www.mapaction.org/
district-reference-maps-of-syria.html.
[7] P. Giabbanelli. Modelling the spatial and social
dynamics of insurgency. Security Informatics, 3:2,
2014.
[8] S. Khuller, M. V. Martinez, D. Nau, A. Sliva, G. I.
Simari, and V. S. Subrahmanian. Computing most
probable worlds of action probabilistic logic programs:
scalable estimation for 1030,000 worlds. Annals of
Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence,
51(2-4):295–331, 2007.
[9] S. Kleinberg. A logic for causal inference in time series
with discrete and continuous variables. In IJCAI 2011,
Proceedings of the 22nd International Joint Conference
on Artificial Intelligence, Barcelona, Catalonia, Spain,
July 16-22, 2011, pages 943–950, 2011.
[10] S. Kleinberg and B. Mishra. The temporal logic of
causal structures. In UAI 2009, Proceedings of the
Twenty-Fifth Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial
Intelligence, Montreal, QC, Canada, June 18-21,
2009, pages 303–312, 2009.
[11] A. Mannes, M. Michael, A. Pate, A. Sliva, V. S.
Subrahmanian, and J. Wilkenfeld. Stochastic
opponent modeling agents: A case study with
Hezbollah. First International Workshop on Social
Computing, Behavioral Modeling, and Prediction,
April 2008.
[12] A. Mannes, A. Sliva, V. S. Subrahmanian, and
J. Wilkenfeld. Stochastic opponent modeling agents:
A case study with Hamas. Proceedings of the Second
International Conference on Computational Cultural
Dynamics (ICCCD), September 2008.
[13] J. Pearl. Causality: Models, Reasoning, and Inference.
Cambridge University Press, 2000.
[14] P. Shakarian, A. Parker, G. I. Simari, and V. S.
Subrahmanian. Annotated probabilistic temporal
logic. ACM Transactions on Computational Logic,
2011.
[15] P. Shakarian, G. I. Simari, and V. S. Subrahmanian.
Annotated probabilistic temporal logic: Approximate
fixpoint implementation. ACM Transactions on
Computational Logic, 2012.
[16] V. S. Subrahmanian, A. Mannes, A. Roul, and R. K.
Raghavan. Indian Mujahideen - Computational
Analysis and Public Policy, volume 1 of Terrorism,
Security, and Computation. Springer, 2013.
[17] V. S. Subrahmanian, A. Mannes, A. Sliva,
J. Shakarian, and J. P. Dickerson. Computational
Analysis of Terrorist Groups: Lashkar-e-Taiba.
Springer, 2013.
[18] P. Suppes. A probabilistic theory of causality.
North-Holland Pub. Co., 1970.
[19] A. Zammit-Mangion, M. Dewar, V. Kadirkamanathan,
and G. Sanguinetti. Point process modelling of the
afghan war diary. Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences, 109(31):12414–12419, 2012.
